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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE 1966 CODE:
THE APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLES 765
AND 768 TO NON-JURY TRIALS
Two important rights of the defendant recognized by the
1966 Code of Criminal Procedure are embodied in article 765 (4),
requiring an opening statement by the state,' and in article
768, requiring the state to give written notice to the defendant
of its intention to introduce in evidence a confession or inculpa-
tory statement.2 In a recent case, the Louisiana supreme court
held that neither is required in non-jury trials.3 One must rec-
ognize that articles 765 (4) and 768 are concerned with two
separate problems and must, therefore, be treated as such. How-
ever, the state's opening statement serves to fix the time by
which notice must be given as required by article 768.4 The
purpose of this Comment is to examine the 1928 and 1966 Codes
of Criminal Procedure, and the accompanying jurisprudence,
in order to determine if article 765 (4) and article 768 should
be applicable to non-jury as well as jury trials.
The State's Opening Statement and the 1928 Code
Under the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure, as clarified in
R.S. 15:0.2, the courts were not forbidden from resorting to
common law, but could do so only when the Code provided no
express law in a particular situation.5 For this reason, the Code
itself must first be examined. Article 333 provided the express
law relative to the state's opening statement:
"The jury having been empaneled and the indictment read,
the trial shall proceed in the following order: The read-
ing of the plea to the jury; the opening statement of the
district attorney explaining the nature of the charge and
1. LA. CODE CalM. P. art. 765: "The normal order of trial shall be as fol-
lows: . . . (4) The opening statements of the state and of the defen-
dant ....
2. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 768: "If the state intends to introduce a con-
fession or inculpatory statement in evidence, it shall so advise the defen-
dant in writing prior to beginning the state's opening statement. If it fails
to do so, a confession or inculpatory statement shall not be admissible in
evidence."
3. State v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 257 So.2d 670 (1972).
4. See note 29 and accompanying text infra.
5. R.S. 15:0.2 (1950) (repealed 1966). "In matters of criminal procedure




the evidence by which he expects to establish the same .
(Emphasis added.)
This would indicate that an opening statement by the state
would not be required in non-jury trials. In State v. Florane,7
the prosecuting attorney attempted to introduce in evidence a
confession over the defense counsel's objection that no opening
statement had been made. Although the jurisprudence had deter-
mined that a confession not mentioned in the state's opening
statement could not be introduced in evidence,8 the supreme
court held in Florane that "[i]t is only in cases where the trial
is before a jury that the district attorney is required to make
an opening statement."9 This decision was followed by the
supreme court in numerous cases and was still authoritative
when the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted.10 The
reasoning of Florane was summarized in a later case:
"This result was reached because Title 15, Section 333 of
the Revised Statutes setting forth the 'Steps in trial' was
limited to jury trials and no codal direction existed relating
to non-jury trials. The procedure for bench trials was, then,
left largely to the trial judge influenced by local practices
and customs.""
Although required in jury trials, this right of the defen-
dant could be waived by failure to object.12 Prior to the 1928
Code, there was no statutory requirement of an opening state-
6. LA. CoDE CRIm. P. art. 333 (1928).
7. 179 La. 453, 154 So. 417 (1934).
8. State v. Garrity, 178 La. 541, 152 So. 77 (1933); State v. Elmore, 177
La. 877, 149 So. 507 (1933); State v. Silsby, 176 La. 727, 146 So. 684 (1933).
See also State v. Ward, 187 La. 585, 175 So. 69 (1937).
9. 179 La. at 461, 154 So. at 419.
10. State v. Dugas, 252 La. 345, 211 So.2d 285 (1968); State v. White,
244 La. 585, 153 So.2d 401 (1963); State v. Palmer, 227 La. 691, 80 So.2d 374
(1955); State v. Sharbino, 194 La. 709, 194 So. 756 (1940).
11. State v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 971, 257 So.2d 670, 678-79 (1972).
12. State v. Shearer, 174 La. 142, 140 So. 4 (1932). The prosecuting at-
torney omitted the opening statement and defendants objected during the
second day of trial. The supreme court held that the defendants had waived
their right to demand an opening statement by the prosecution, reasoning
that although R.S. 15:333 was mandatory in jury trials, having been enacted
"for the benefit and in the interest of the accused, . . . the going to trial
by a defendant without insisting that such formalities be complied with is
considered a waiver of the right conferred." Id. at 145-46, 140 So. at 5-6.
However, if the defendant objected timely to the state's failure to make
an opening statement, the failure of the trial judge to require an opening
statement would be reversible error. See State v. Leslie, 244 La. 921, 155 So.2d
19 (1963).
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ment by the prosecution and no case can be found dealing with
the problem; therefore, the above jurisprudence properly dem-
onstrates the status of the law regarding the state's opening
statment prior to the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure.
Written Notice by the State and the 1928 Code
Although the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure contained
no express provision concerning notice to the defendant if the
state intended to introduce a confession or inculpatory state-
ment, the courts construed the purpose of the state's opening
statement as requiring:
"[the prosecutor] 'to show his hand' by explaining, not
only the nature of the crime charged, but the nature and
character of the evidence by which he expect[ed] to estab-
lish it as well, thereby enabling the accused the better to
meet the issue and make his defense."'18
Thus, the state had to mention the confession in its opening
statement if it intended to introduce it in evidence.14 While this
practice provided the accused an opportunity to prepare his
defense, the state faced the hazard that a confession or incul-
patory statement, read as part of the opening statement, might
later be ruled inadmissible; if this occurred, reversible error
had been committed.1 5
The State's Opening Statement and the 1966 Code
Article 3 of the 1966 Code abrogates the rule of the 1928
Code that the courts could resort to common law if the Code
did not specifically deal with a particular situation. Louisiana
courts must first look to the legislation and then "proceed in a
manner consistent with the spirit of the provisions of the
13. State v. Shearer, 174 La. 142, 145, 140 So. 4, 5 (1932). See State v.
Jones, 230 La. 356, 88 So.2d 655 (1956); State v. Ducre, 173 La. 438, 137 So.
745 (1931). But see State v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 257 So.2d 670 (1972); State
v. Dillon, 260 La. 215, 255 So.2d 745 (1971); and State v. White, 244 La. 585,
153 So.2d 401 (1963), for the purpose accorded the state's opening statement
under the 1966 Code.
14. See cases cited at note 8 supra.
15. State v. Cannon, 184 La. 514, 166 So. 485 (1936).
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Code ... ."16 Article 765 provides that the "normal order of trial
shall be . . .""I and requires as one of those steps an opening
statement by the state. The article contains no words of limita-
tion. Comment (c) under article 765 provides:
"The provision of C.C.P. Art. 1632, which authorizes the
court to vary the order when circumstances justify, is
omitted from this article, because it seems dangerous in
criminal cases. Variations can occur, of course, if the defen-
dant does not object, but the court should not have the
power to order variations over the defendant's objection."
The Code itself gives direction in determining the intent
of article 765 by providing that "[t]he word 'shall' is mandatory,
and the word 'may' is permissive."' s Therefore, the article should
be read as leaving the trial judge no discretion concerning the
state's opening statement.
The intent of article 765 also may be demonstrated by the
arrangement of its language as compared to R.S. 15:333. R.S.
15:333 provided "[t]he jury having been empaneled and the
indictment read, the trial shall proceed in the following order
... ." (Emphasis added.) Obviously this provision refers exclu-
sively to jury trials. Article 765, however, has no limiting lan-
guage before the mandatory requirement that "[t]he normal
order of trial shall be as follows .... "19 It is to be noted that
the mandatory language in article 765 pertains to all steps in
trial. By comparing the placement of the mandatory language
in the present article with the old provision, it can be concluded
that the legislature intended the present article to apply to non-
jury and jury trials.
In addition to the placement of the mandatory language in
article 765, the generality of the language itself "denies any
attempt to restrict its application to jury trials alone. ' 20
16. LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 3: "Where no procedure is specifically pre-
scribed by this Code or by statute, the court may proceed in a manner con-
sistent with the spirit of the provisions of this Code and other applicable
statutory and constitutional provisions." The method of analysis required
by the Code is stressed because of the court's resort to common law juris-
prudence and other state statutes in State v. Himel.
17. LA. CODS CRme. P. art. 765.
18. Id. art. 5.
19. Id. art. 765.




The primary purpose of the state's opening statement is to
"explain the nature of the charge, and set forth, in general terms,
the nature of the evidence by which the state expects to prove
the charge. '21 Article 769 contains the well settled jurispruden-
tial rule that evidence "not fairly within the scope of the open-
ing statement of the state shall not be admitted in evidence."
The rule is modified, however, in the second paragraph of that
article, which permits the court to admit evidence that the state
has inadvertently and in good faith failed to mention in its
opening statement.2 2 But the discretion of the court in admit-
ting such evidence is not unbridled; for, although the evidence
was inadvertently and in good faith omitted, the court cannot
admit the evidence "if it finds that the defendant is . . . taken
by surprise or prejudiced in the preparation of his defense."
This latter limitation indicates that the primary purpose of the
state's opening statement is to benefit the defendant.24
The opening statement further serves to fix the time at
which the state must give the defendant written notice if it
intends to introduce a confession or inculpatory statement.25
However, neither article 769 nor article 768 contains any words
that would limit these requirements to jury trials.
Another significant factor is the provision concerning waiver
of opening statements in article 765. Although this article per-
mits the defendant to waive his opening statement, no mention
is made of the state's corresponding right.28 Having expressly
dealt with the waiver of opening statements by defendants and
not having made reference to the right of the state to waive
its statement, "the clear meaning which emerges from this ar-
ticle is that an opening statement is required by the State in
all cases-jury and non-jury alike."
21. LA. CODU CrUM. P. art. 766.
22. LA. CODE] OF CRIM. P. art. 769 reads in part: "If the state offers evidence
that was inadvertently and in good faith omitted from the opening state-
ment, the court, in its discretion may admit the evidence if it finds the de-
fendant is not taken by surprise or prejudiced In the preparation of his
defense."
23. Id.
24. But see State v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 257 So.2d 670 (1972); State v.
Dillon, 260 La. 215, 255 So.2d 745 (1971); State v. White, 244 La. 585, 153
So.2d 401 (1963).
25. See Justice Summers' dissent in H4mel, 260 La. at 966, 257 So.2d at 677.
26. LA. CODE CmM. P. art. 765: "A defendant may waive his opening state-
ment."




If an opening statement by the state is mandatory in all
trials, may the defendant, by his own inaction, waive the state's
opening statement? The Code does not answer this problem but
comment (c) under article 765 lends direction by declaring that
variations can occur in the normal order of trial if the defen-
dant does not object. 28 It therefore appears that the defendant
will voluntarily waive his right to an opening statement by the
prosecution if he fails to make timely objection. It must be
pointed out, however, that the court should not "order variations
over the defendant's objection,"29 and thus should not allow the
state to dispense with its opening statement over the objection
of the defendant.
Notice of Confessions and Inculpatory Statements
Under the 1966 Code
As previously discussed,30 under the 1928 Code the state had
to mention a confession or inculpatory statement in its opening
statement if it intended to introduce it in evidence. Since this
constituted notice to the defendant, there was no requirement
of notice prior to the state's opening statement. Many problems
were involved in such a procedure. 31 Although the procedure
obviously involved substantial damage to the defendant,32 the
Code recognized the need of the defendant to be apprised of
the evidence against him. One of the purposes of the 1966 Code
of Criminal Procedure was to present "an entirely new approach
to the problem of reference to a confession [or inculpatory
statement] in [the state's] opening statement."8 8 Article 767
provides that "[t]he state shall not, in the opening statement,
advert in any way to a confession or inculpatory statement
made by the defendant." Article 768 further provides that:
"[i]f the state intends to introduce a confession or inculpa-
28. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 765, comment (c): "Variations [in the normal
order of trial] can occur, of course, if the defendant does not object, but
the court should not have the power to order variations over the defendant's
objection."
29. Id.
30. See note 8 supra.
31. Bennett, The 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure, 27 LA. L. REv. 175,
216 (1967).
32. The procedure involved substantial damage to the defendant in that
the notice, given in the state's opening statement, Immediately informed
the jury that defendant had made a confession or inculpatory statement.
This would tend to raise a presumption of guilt from the outset of the trial.
33. LA. CoDE CRIM. P. art. 796, comment (c)(2).
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tory statement in evidence, it shall so advise the defendant
in writing prior to beginning the state's opening statement.
If it fails to do so a confession or inculpatory statement shall
not be admissible in evidence."
No language contained in these articles in any way limits their
application to jury trials.
The argument has been made that article 70334 and the juris-
prudence dealing with pre-trial discovery of confessions85 have
weakened the need for making article 768 mandatory. Although
article 703 and the Louisiana jurisprudence have allowed pre-
trial discovery of written or video-taped confessions and incul-
patory statements, there is still no authority allowing pre-trial
discovery of the defendant's oral confession or inculpatory state-
ment.36 It is submitted that an oral confession or inculpatory
statement introduced in evidence without prior notice to the
defendant can surprise the defendant at least as much as a writ-
ten one. In any event, the comments to article 703 indicate that
the legislature intended that article 768 should not be affected
by article 703.3" Article 768 is clear-it applies to all confessions
and inculpatory statements made by the defendant. Conse-
quently, it must be concluded that articles 767 and 768 are man-
datory in both jury and non-jury trials.
An additional problem is whether the defendant, by waiving
the state's opening statement, also waives his right to demand
written notice as required in article 768. Under the Code, the
only correlation of the state's opening statement with the re-
quirement of written notice is that the time designated for giving
the opening statement is also the time by which the state must
have given the notice required by article 768.88 Except for this
34. Id. art. 703 (B): "A defendant may move to suppress for use as evi-
dence at the trial on the merits a written confession or written inculpatory
statement, on any ground that would make it inadmissible as evidence."
35. State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 244 So.2d 200 (1971); State v. Pesson,
256 La. 201, 235 So.2d 568 (1970); State v. Crook, 253 La. 961, 221 So.2d 473
(1969); State v. Hunter, 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273 (1967); State v. Johnson,
249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135 (1966).
36. State v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 257 So.2d 670 (1972).
37. LA. CODS CRuM. P. art 703, comment (f): "This article does not affect
the operation of Art. 767, prohibiting advertence to any confession or incul-
patory statement In the state's opening statement, nor Art. 768, requiring
notice to the defendant of Intention to introduce a confession or inculpatory
statement. If a motion to suppress a confession or inculpatory statement
is denied, the notice required by Art. 768 must be given if the state decides
to introduce the confession or inculpatory statement."
38. See note 25 supra.
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temporal relationship, notice of intent to use confessions and
the state's opening statement are two separate and distinct
problems. Thus, if the defendant waives his right to an opening
statement by the prosecution, then the time by which the state
must have given notice would be the time allotted for that pur-
pose by article 765. This is not to say that the defendant could
not voluntarily waive his right to demand the written notice
required by article 768; but waiver of the state's opening state-
ment should not automatically result in waiver of his right to
demand the notice required by article 768.
Judicial Interpretations of the 1966 Code
The State's Opening Statement
It appears that the supreme court regards the state's open-
ing statement as a device primarily to aid the jury and not to
assist the defendant in the preparation of his defense.89 In State
v. Kreller, the supreme court stated that
"the District Attorney's opening statement forms no part
of the evidence, has no binding force, and is designed only
to give a general acquaintance with the case which will
enable the jury to understand and appreciate the testimony
as it falls from the lips of the witnesses."
Although defined in this manner, the state's opening statement
would nevertheless be required in all trials if the normal order
of trial established by article 765 were considered mandatory.
But the supreme court has not interpreted article 765 in such a
manner.
"There is nothing in article 765 indicating that the steps in
the normal order of trial are sacramental. All the steps in
article 765 refer to jury trials; there is one reference to the
announcement of the judgment in non-jury cases. There is,
however, nothing contained in the article to indicate that
an opening statement . . . is essential in a non-jury case."'4 1
39. State v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 958, 257 So.2d 670, 674 (1972): "[W]e are
of the opinion that the office of the opening statement is primarily to pro-
gram the jury so that it may better follow and understand the evidence as
it unfolds during the trial." Although not within the scope of this article,
it should be noted that whether the state's opening statement is designed
primarily for the jury or the defendant, the present brevity of the state's
opening statement prevents it from benefiting anyone.
40. 255 La. 982, 991, 233 So.2d 906, 909 (1970).
41. State v. Didier, 259 La. 967, 979-80, 254 So.2d 262, 267 (1971).
1973]
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The reasons for this rule were further articulated in State
v. Himel.42 After stating that article 765 was not entirely limited
in its scope to jury trials, the court determined which provisions
of the article apply to non-jury trials. Comparing article 761,
which provides that "[a] trial by a judge alone commences when
the first witness is sworn," with article 765, the court reasoned
that any steps in article 765 which preceded the presentation of
evidence were applicable only to jury trials. Thus, the state's
opening statement was made applicable only to jury trials.
Justice Summers pointed out in his dissent in Himel that,
although article 761 does set the time for commencement of
trial, the purpose of the article is
"to fix definitely the point of beginning the trial in order
that it may be ascertained when jeopardy begins, when a
motion to quash must be filed and to measure limitations
for its prosecution. ' 43 (Citations omitted.)
If article 761 is read in this manner, then it is certainly possible
that the legislature intended article 765 to provide the defen-
dant with the right to demand an opening statement by the
state prior to the formal commencement of the trial.44
As a result of the supreme court's ruling in Himel, article
765 does apply to all trials. However, those steps listed in the
article that occur prior to the "commencement" of non-jury
trials as defined by article 761 are applicable only to jury trials.
Thus, the opening statement by the state is not mandatory in
non-jury trials.
Article 768 and the Supreme Court
The supreme court has interpreted an inculpatory state-
ment to be "the out-of-court admission of incriminating facts
made by a defendant after the crime has been committed. It
relates to past events. '45 Under this definition the state does
not have to give written notice to the defendant of those state-
ments made by him before the crime was committed. In addi-
tion, the supreme court has held that the state does not have to
42. 260 La. 949, 257 So.2d 670 (1972).
43. 260 La. at 975, 257 So.2d at 680.
44. State v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 966, 257 So.2d 670, 677 (1972) (dissenting
opinion).
45. State v. Fink, 255 La. 385, 390, 231 So.2d 360, 362 (1970).
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analyze its evidence to determine if the testimony sought to be
introduced is a confession or inculpatory statement.46 This
means that not until the presentation of the state's evidence
does the defendant know whether to prepare his defense to meet
an oral confession or an oral inculpatory statement.47
Another area of concern is the written notice itself. In State
v. Anderson, the supreme court held that the following notice
substantially complied with article 768:
"'The State of Louisiana intends to introduce in evidence
each and every confession and statement of each and every-
one of these defendants, whether same be oral or recorded
(and later transcribed into writing) or written, and whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, particularly BUT NOT LIM-
ITED TO the following statements . . . .' "4
Although the 1966 Code does not lend direction in determining
how detailed the written notice required by article 768 must be,
it is obvious that a broad notice such as that in Anderson gives
little, if any, warning to the defendant to enable him to prepare
his defense adequately.49
In addition to permitting such broad notice, the court has
allowed the writen notice to be given immediately preceding
the state's opening statement. ° This decision seems to be within
article 768 in that the article simply requires that the written
notice be given prior to the state's opening statement, and spec-
ifies no limit concerning how far in advance of the opening
statement the notice must be given.,51
46. State v. Palmer, 251 La. 759, 766, 206 So.2d 485, 487 (1968).
47. See notes 34, 35, 36 and accompanying text supra.
48. 254 La. 1107, 1133-34, 229 So.2d 329, 338 (1969).
49. The writer suggests that, if the state uses such nonspecific notice,
the court would abuse its discretion by refusing a defendant's request for a
recess after the confession or inculpatory statement was introduced so that
he could properly prepare his defense.
50. State v. Rodgers, 251 La. 953, 207 So.2d 755 (1968).
51. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 769, comment (d): "The Louisiana system
results in a defendant being put on notice of the facts he has to face, at the
very late time of the opening statement, immediately after which the de-
fendant is involved in battling with the state. It Is no exaggeration to say
that a defendant can be made to prepare his defense against a charge of
murder with far less opportunity or time than he would have to prepare




The supreme court, in State v. LaCoste, 2 went even further
in limiting the protection afforded by article 768 by declaring
that if the state inadvertently and in good faith fails to give
the written notice required by article 768, the defendant must
either object timely or waive his right to demand notice. Al-
though the article gives no latitude in requiring that the state
give written notice, the court reasoned that article 769 granted
it this discretion. This article provides that the court may admit
evidence that was inadvertently and in good faith omitted from
the state's opening statement "if it finds that the defendant is
not taken by surprise or prejudiced in the preparation of his
defense."' This article, by its language, relates only to evidence
omitted from the state's opening statement. As Justice Sanders
stated in his dissent in State v. LaCoste, "[t]he majority, in
my opinion, erroneously transpose[d] this discretion to Article
768."154
Although the supreme court had severely limited the pro-
tection afforded the defendant by Article 768, the court had
never declared article 768 applicable to jury trials alone until
State v. Himel.55 The reasoning of the court in not requiring
written notice in non-jury trials is unclear. The court stated
that if "[i]nculpatory statements are treated in parity with the
evidence to be disclosed in the opening statement"563 and if the
state's opening statement is not mandatory in non-jury trials,
then it follows that requiring the state to give written notice as
required in article 768 is not mandatory in non-jury trials. As
52. 256 La. 697, 237 So.2d 871 (1970). Two assistant district attorneys
were jointly prosecuting the case and each had thought, mistakenly, that
the other had delivered the written notice to the defendant. Upon discover-
ing their mistake, they delivered the written notice to the defendant. The
defense counsel had the inculpatory statement in his hands for approxi-
mately 12 hours before he objected that its admission would be a violation
of article 768 of the 1966 Code. There was no question concerning the prose-
cution's good faith or that it was an inadvertent mistake.
53. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 769.
54. 256 La. at 743, 237 So.2d at 888 (dissenting opinion).
55. 260 La. 949, 257 So.2d 670 (1972).
56. Id. at 965, 257 So.2d at 676. In declaring that inculpatory statements
are to be treated in parity with the other evidence to be disclosed in the
state's opening statement, the supreme court relied on State v. LaCoste, 256
La. 697, 237 So.2d 871 (1970). "The effect of the holding in the recent case
of State v. Lacoste [sic] [citation omitted) was to make the exception to
the exclusion of evidence under Article 769 applicable to the notice of the
confession or inculpatory statement under Article 768. This treatment of
the inculpatory statement shows it to be no more and no less important
than the other matters which are included in the opening statement." State
v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 965, 257 So.2d 670, 679 (1972).
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previously discussed, the procedure of requiring the state to
give notice to the defendant of its intention to introduce confes-
sions was removed by the 1966 Code from the opening state-
ment.57 The only relation the state's opening statement has with
article 768 is to fix the time by which the state must have given
the written notice required by that article.58 Merely because
the state's opening statement is not mandatory, it does not fol-
low that the requirement of written notice is not mandatory.
In State v. Himel, the supreme court expressed its desire
to provide swift administration of criminal justice:
"If opening arguments were mandated in bench trials, our
city courts, traffic courts, other courts of limited jurisdic-
tion, and the misdemeanor sections of our district courts
would be unduly burdened with an unnecessary and time-
consuming procedural device to further crowd their already
clogged dockets. At a time when millions of dollars are
being spent nationwide to find more expeditious ways and
means of administering criminal justice, it is fortunate that
our Legislature has not made this step backward."5
Although this language was directed to the state's opening state-
ment, it is equally applicable to the procedure of giving written
notice to the defendant.
While judicial efficiency is obviously a desirable end, the
writer submits that the supreme court should reevaluate its
elimination of the effects of articles 765 and 768. The 1966 Code
of Criminal Procedure, without words of limitation to jury trials,
requires an opening statement be made by the state and written
notice be given to the defendant. Even if applying articles 765
and 768 only to jury trials would expedite criminal proceed-
ings, it would appear that a limitation of this magnitude should
be made only by the legislature. If the legislature desires to
expedite criminal proceedings, two alternatives are available.
Articles 765 and 768 could be made applicable to all trials except
those in which a prosecuting attorney is not used; or articles
765 and 768 could be made applicable to all trials except city
court and parish trials in which the necessary informal pro-
57. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
58. Id.
59. 260 La. at 963 n.10, 257 So.2d at 676 n.10.
1973]
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ceedings are incompatible with the procedures of articles 765
and 768.w In both instances the requirements of these articles
would only undermine the desired informalities in such pro-
ceedings.
Ronald Loyd Holmes
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION IN LOUISIANA
Medical malpractice1 in Louisiana has been defined as a
physician or surgeon's dereliction from his professional duty
to possess and exercise the skill ordinarily employed by the
members of his profession; or as a breach of his duty to apply
this skill to the case with reasonable care and diligence, along
with his best judgment.2 If the definition of medical malpractice
were so limited, those actions arising out of professional conduct,
but not based upon a want of professional skill and reasonable
care, would be excluded. However, actions which may not fall
within the above definition, such as abandonment or unauthor-
ized medical treatment, are frequently classified as malpractice
actions. The primary purpose of this paper is to compare the
principles of tort law to the problems of the medical malpractice
action.
60. LA. CODS CRIM. P. art. 15: "A. The provisions of this Code, except as
otherwise specifically provided by other statutes, shall govern and regulate
the procedure in criminal prosecutions and proceedings in district courts.
They also shall govern criminal prosecutions in city, parish, juvenile, and
family courts, except insofar as a particular provision is incompatible with
the general nature and organization of, or special procedures established or
authorized by law for, those courts." (Emphasis added.)
Comment (d) lends direction in interpreting article 15 by providing that
"[a]pplication of this Code to city courts presents a particularly difficult and
important problem. Many rules of the Code apply to all criminal prosecu-
tions. Others, by their very nature, are inapplicable to the more informal
procedures for the trial of minor cases in city courts."
1. "Malpractice. A dereliction from professional duty whether inten-
tional, criminal or merely negligent by one rendering professional services
that result in injury, loss or damage to the recipient of those services or
to those entitled to rely upon them or that affects the public interest
adversely." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1969).
2. See Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, 619, 73 So.2d
781, 782 (1953): "A physician, surgeon or dentist . . . is not required to
exercise the highest degree of skill and care possible. As a general rule
it is his duty to exercise the degree of skill ordinarily employed, under
similar circumstances, by the members of his profession in good standing
in the same community or locality, and to use reasonable care and diligence,
along with his best judgment, in the application of his skill to the case."
